Until 1999 children born out of wedlock in Chile had di¤erent child support rights to those born to married couples. I interpret this law change as an increase in bargaining power of woman in cohabiting relationships.
Introduction
The distribution of consumption within the household is crucial to the understanding of the well being of its members and the design of public policies. From
The author thanks James R. Hines, Dean Yang, Joel Slemrod, Taryn Dinkelman and seminar participants at the University of Michigan for helpful discussions. a conceptual perspective, distinguishing the appropriate household model sheds light on how consumption decisions are taken while highlighting the importance of information, preferences, and power distribution within the household. Assuming e¢ ciency of the intra-household allocation leads to policy interventions that could increase the utility of some household members to the detriment of others. It is possible to design mechanisms and interventions that could increase the welfare of all household members if this assumption is invalid.
The unitary model of the household is the starting point of the analysis of household decisions (for a summary of the literature see Lundberg and Pollak(1996) and Pollak(2005) ). Proposed by Becker, the unitary model treats households as entities with unique preferences. That is, all household members have the same utility function or household decisions are taken using only preferences of one household member. In consequence, the family member who owns the family income or wealth is irrelevant for household decisions.
In contrast to the unitary model, there is a growing literature documenting that household outcomes are a¤ected by the distribution of power within the household. (Lundberg, Pollak and Wales(1997), Du ‡o (2000) , Du ‡o and Udry (2003) , Rangel (2004) , Fortin and Lacroix(1997) ). Indeed, it has become commonly accepted that women spend their money more 'wisely'. For example, cash transfer programs as Oportunidades in Mexico 1 give the transfer to the child's mother, instead of the father.
A critical concern in the design of the tests of household models is the need for exogenous variation in resources distribution or bargaining power. For example, using labor income as a signal of bargaining power is incorrect because it is itself determined by the bargaining process: if we observe that more educated women work more, we can't infer that the bargaining power made them work more. Therefore most of the recent literature has focused on changes or 1 Conditional cash-transfer program. For a description see Gertler and Boyce (2001) .
di¤erences in non labor income that are not subject to this critique.
However, if pre-couple formation labor income determines the 'marriage market'outcome, as suggested by Becker, and the bargaining occurs in the marriage market rather than within the marriage, non labor income is no longer a good proxy of bargaining power. If, for example, wealthier women match with men with preferences similar to theirs, we could observe that their non labor income is positively correlated with children's outcome, but it will not re ‡ect any bargaining within the household.
The ideal experiment is a random assignment of nonlabor income to husbands and wives. Such an experiment does not exist. For these reasons, the literature is moving towards using exogenous variation on resource ownership or bargaining power to study the e¤ect of power distribution on family outcomes.
For example, Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales(1997) use a change in public policy that a¤ects the distribution of public transfers to the household. Du ‡o (2000) studies a di¤erent change in public policy that a¤ects the level of transfers.
Finally, Rangel(2004) investigates a change in alimony rights that would a¤ect bargaining power.
In this paper I use a law change that increased child support rights for children from non married couples in Chile as the source of exogenous variation in the bargaining power distribution within cohabitant households. Child support for out of wedlock children increased from a level of "basic subsistence" to a level according to their "social status". Since children usually live with their mother if the couple splits, the law change would increase women's bargaining power.
Using a panel of cross-sections, I …nd a 2 percentage point increase (for a mean of 0.81) in school attendance for children between 14 and 18 years old, a 2 percentage point increase (for a mean of 0.22) in daycare attendance for boys between 0 and 5 years old, and a decrease in the probability of working of 1 percentage point for men. The results are robust to a false experiment where the data is arbitrary divided in a pre and post reform period.
The increase in school attendance can be interpreted as a movement towards women's' preferences in cohabiting relationships once their bargaining power increased. The decrease in the father's hours of work can be interpreted as a result of a substitution e¤ect induced by the increase in the bargaining power of women. Both results add to the growing evidence against the unitary household model. The second sheds light on alternative household models.
The most commonly used model after the unitary household model is the collective model, which assumes Pareto optimality of the household outcome (Chiappori (1988) ). Non cooperative models could lead to Pareto optimality, and it is argued that families would reach it since they have multiple opportunities to play the same game. However, family violence and abuse indicate that equilibrium is not always attained. Furthermore, the assumption of an e¢ cient household allocation has been previously rejected by Udry (1996) and Du ‡o and Udry (2003) . The …rst shows di¤erences in productivity depending on which family member is the plot owner and the second uses rainfall shocks that a¤ect crops di¤erently and …nds a change in the composition of expenditure.
The decrease in father's probability of working can be interpreted in the context of an individual maximization where a decrease in bargaining power is interpreted as a tax in his/her wages. This 'tax' would not be correcting any misallocation and it is therefore ine¢ cient. Until October 1999, di¤erences between children of unmarried mothers and children of married parents were observed in names, inheritance, and child support rights. Children born out of wedlock were called "illegitimate", while children born inside a marriage were called "legitimate"
children. The "type" of child was stamped in the certi…cate of birth, which is required for admission to schools.
Legitimate children had the right to child support that would allow them to reach a living status corresponding to their social level, whereas illegitimate children had only the right to a minimum subsistence level. 3 Regarding inheritance, an illegitimate child had rights to one half of the portion that legitimate children had. Furthermore, children born out of wedlock didn't have legal grandfathers, which implied that they were not entitled to inheritance or child support from them when their parents were incapable of providing it.
All these di¤erences were abolished in 1999, and since then there are no 2 Anuario de estadisticas Vitales 2003. Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas, Chile. 3 The actual level was …xed by the judge and there is no data on its value. The average alimony now is between 50,000 and 150,000 pesos monthly (http://www.economiaynegocios.cl).
(US$86 and US$258). The minimum wage is US$208 approximately. di¤erent child "types". The reform also changed the procedure to recognize children born out of wedlock. A natural …rst step to claim child support is to identify the father. The reform allowed the use of DNA to do that, and made the exam free when facing …nancial need 4 .
Alimony is mainly claimed for children 5 , but can also be claimed by elders from their child and within a marriage if one of the members can provide proof of …nancial need. The latter are usually not given if the demander has the ability to work. Before the law change, the mother had to show that the father was working and was able to pay, which resulted in a long and hard process, which mostly disadvantaged poor families. 6 Now, it is assumed that the father can pay a minimum pension, which is approximately $40,200 (Chilean pesos) for a child below 18 years old 7 and 30% of the minimum income for each additional child. However, the pension cannot be higher than 50% of the income of the parent who is giving it.
If the father is declared as unable to pay, the grandfathers can be sued to pay instead of him. If a father does not pay the child support, he can be condemned to night arrest or can serve arrest for up to 15 days in prison.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data come from two sources: the Chilean National Survey of Socioeconomic 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2003) are used in the analysis: …ve of them (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) correspond to the period before the law change and two (2000 and 2003) to the period after the law change.
The …rst wave of the panel was formed from 5,326 randomly selected households from the 1996 CASEN. They come from four out of the country's thirteen regions, including the metropolitan region.
9 4,060 households were successfully found in 2001, the year of the second wave.
The survey does not have a question about children "types", but it allows one to identify the gender of the household head and whether they are married, cohabitants, widowed, anulled or single. In the analysis it will be assumed that children from cohabitant couples were born out of wedlock and therefore would have been classi…ed as "illegitimate" before 1999, and children from married parents are "legitimate". Furthermore, it is not possible to distinguish if they live with their biological parents because the survey asks for the relationship with the household head and groups child and stepchild under the same code.
This will bias the results downwards. old), where 79% of children from married relationships attend school while the attendance rate is only 69% for children from cohabiting relationships. Note that school attendance in primary school is close to universal in both groups. Finally, 8% and 11% of children from married and cohabiting relationships respectively work and this status is concentrated among boys.
3 Theoretical Framework
The Unitary Model
The unitary model assumes that the household makes decisions as one individual. All income is pooled and there is no bargaining. Therefore, changes in bargaining power would have no e¤ect on household outcomes.
A simple setup of a bargaining model is one where the household maximizes:
where f stands for female and m for male. The parameters, f and m represent the bargaining power of each member, c is a consumption good that can be bought in the market at price p c , and l f ; l m stands for leisure. Note that each household member has its own utility function, but it includes each other's consumption.
The maximization is subject to the following restrictions:
where Y f and Y m represent non labor income, and T is the total number of hours that can be allocated to leisure or work. The solution of this problem gives a demand function for each of the goods of the form:
It is clear from this setup that an increase in female's bargaining power should move the household's consumption bundle according to her preferences. 3.2 The Nash-Bargaining Model McElroy and Horney (1980) propose a household bargaining model, where it is assumed that the allocation achieves the Nash solution of a two-person, nonzero sum game. Households maximize a utility-gain production function The household maximizes N subject to a household budget constraint
As before, the system implies demands of the form
, but the structure imposed allows us to derive comparative statics.
It is worth noting that changes in the 'extrahousehold environmental parameters'will have no e¤ect on the budget constraint, but only a¤ect the utility-gain production function through the reservation utilities. Intuitively, an increase in f will change the family's marginal rate of substitution between goods that she prefers and goods that he prefers. Considering his and her leisure, since the budget constraint does not change, the variation in the shape of the "iso-gain product curve" (the household indi¤erence curve in the Nash context) unambiguously implies an increase in males'labor supply and a decrease in females' labor supply as long as women are "sel…sh".
Formally, McElroy and Horney (1980) de…ne the "family rate of substitu-
Nj , and show that
The …rst and third term are positive. If she is 'sel…sh', then the second term is also positive.
A Tax Model
A basic tax model assumes that individuals only see the tax and do not value the goods on which the tax revenue is spent. From a household perspective, an increase in female's bargaining power can be interpreted as a wage tax on men as long as they do not value any of the goods that will be consumed by the household with this new sharing rule. That is, an increase in females'bargaining power increases fathers'contribution to the goods that she prefers, and for which he enjoys no bene…t.
This contradicts the unitary model in several ways: household members have di¤erent utility functions, which depend on di¤erent goods and resources are not pooled, but extracted from each other. The model also contradicts the Nash bargaining model: household's members utilities are not interdependent and the solution to the bargaining problem is a not cooperative equilibrium.
The Slutsky equation for wage changes is:
An increase in taxes implies a decrease in the net wage. By the substitution e¤ect, leisure increases and hours worked decrease. By the income e¤ect, leisure should decrease and hours worked increase. The net impact is ambiguous and its size and sign is an empirical question.
Model Predictions
The unitary household model assumes that households act as one entity. Hence, the changes in the bargaining position of their members should have no e¤ect on household outcomes.
Household bargaining models allow household members to have di¤erent utility functions, for which changes in bargaining power could a¤ect household outcomes. In particular, in the Nash-bargaining model an increase in females' bargaining power decreases their worked hours and increases the male's worked hours.
Nash bargaining assumes that the household outcome will be e¢ cient. If an increase in female's bargaining power is understood by her partner as a wage tax, the induced income and substitution e¤ect lead to an uncertain e¤ect on his labor supply, making its sign an empirical question.
The next section tests the unitary model, using both children's outcomes (school attendance and child work) and parents'labor market outcomes. Any e¤ect of the law change can be interpreted as a rejection of the unitary household model. The sign and signi…cance of the labor market outcome allows us distinguish between the Nash bargaining and tax model.
The Law E¤ect 4.1 Empirical Speci…cation
Two sets of outcomes are studied: labor market outcomes (hours worked and work status) and child's outcomes (school attendance and child work). The law e¤ect will be identi…ed from di¤erences in the pattern of these outcomes between married and cohabitant households after 1999 compared to before 10 .
The identi…cation assumption is the existence of a parallel trend between cohabitant and married couples in the absence of the law change. That is, for any period besides the period after the law change:
where y j is the outcome of interest, C = 1 for cohabitant couples, and C = 0 for married couples and t is time 11 .
In a regression framework, this di¤erence in di¤erence speci…cation is:
The parameter of interest is 3 , which will capture the e¤ect of the law change in cohabitant couples.
There are observable di¤erences between the cohabitant and married group.
As long as these di¤erences are constant across time and don't interact with the law e¤ect, including controls should not change the relevant estimated coef…cients. When using cross sectional data, I include observables that are stable over time in order to avoid potential endogeneities (for example, one should not include income in the labor market outcomes' equation because lack of work a¤ects the income level) .
A concern with this approach is the existence of changes in the composition For school attendance, child work, and work status, the regression is speci…ed as a probit. For hours worked, both OLS and tobit results are reported.
18 years old each year because the law guarantees them the right to alimony until that age and to increase the likelihood of having them living with their parents. Table ( 2) shows the percentage of children living with their parents by age.
Children from other family "types" (single or annuled) were not included because of their small sample size.
Results

School Attendance and Child Work
In this section individual level regressions are used to study the e¤ect of the law change in children's outcomes: school attendance and child work. Both are interesting when considering children's welfare and can also shed light on intra-household bargaining. Table ( 3) shows school attendance at di¤erent ages. In 1998, 23% of children between 0 and 5 years old were attending school, which increases to 98% of those the primary school age range (6-13 years old). The corresponding …gure is 81% for children in secondary school age.
Three age groups are de…ned according to Chilean schooling levels: preschool (0-5 years old), primary school (6-13 years old), and secondary school (14-18 years old). Since school attendance is close to universal for the primary age group, the reform e¤ect is not expected to be observed in this group.
Figures (2), (3), and (4) show the average school attendance for each age group separately for cohabiting and married couples. All of them show a decrease in the gap between married and cohabiting after the law change, but the di¤erence is more striking in …gure (2) for the oldest group (14-18 years).
Tables (4), (5), and (6) show children level regressions of school attendance for each age group. Three sets of regressions are shown: one for the whole sample, and one for boys and girls separately. For each set, four regressions are shown. In the …rst one, no controls are included besides the child's age.
The second includes household head schooling and age together with an urban and regional dummies. Children's age is replaced by age dummies in the last two regressions to capture any non linear e¤ects of age. The tables report the marginal e¤ects from probit estimations. Standard errors are clustered at the household level.
Table (4), shows the impact of the law change on school attendance of children between 14 and 18 years old. Children from cohabitant couples increase their school attendance by 2 percentage points with respect to children from married couples after the law change. Because no income transfer was established with the law change for the household types under study, the e¤ect is a direct response to changes in women's bargaining position 12 .
The magnitude and signi…cance of the e¤ect is stable to di¤erent speci…ca-tions and the standard errors are smaller for girls than for boys.This is the age group for which a larger e¤ect was expected. The increase in school attendance of 2 percentage points is relevant given that the mean of the dependent variable is 0.81 for the whole sample.
As expected, table (5) shows no signi…cant e¤ect of the law change for the age group 6 to 13 years old neither for the whole sample, nor when it is divided by gender. Since school attendance is almost universal in this group there is not margin to move.
Finally, the e¤ect on the youngest age group can be seen in table(6), where we observe an increase in school attendance of 1 to 1.4 percentage points, signi…cant at the 10% level. When the sample is divided by gender, the coe¢ cient on the interaction is only signi…cant for boys and implies an increase in school attendance of 2-2.8 percentage points.
A concern with these results is that they may re ‡ect an underlying trend in cohabitant versus married households and not the e¤ect of the law change. To address this concern, false experiments are implemented in the pre-law change period. In this case, I arti…cially de…ne the before period as the years 1990 to 1994 and the after period as 1996 to 1998. In the absence of an underlying trend speci…c to the cohabitant group, the interaction between the cohabitant and after dummy should be insigni…cant.
Tables (7) and (8) show the result of the false experiment for school attendance of the oldest and youngest age group. No e¤ect is found for the interaction when the sample is pooled or when it is separated by gender. This suggests the absence of an underlying trend that could explain the previous results for these age groups.
A second outcome of interest regarding child's welfare is child work. The surveys only ask labor market questions to individuals who are 12 years or older.
Given that the e¤ect on school attendance was found for the age group 14-18, the sample is restricted to that age group. Table (9) shows a decrease in the probability of child work for the older age group of 0.01 at di¤erent levels of signi…cance for the whole sample and for boys. No signi…cant e¤ect is found for girls.
13 Table ( 10) shows that prior to the law change there was no trend in child work. Although the statistical signi…cance of the law e¤ect is not as robust as in the case of school attendance, the sign and magnitude of the coe¢ cients are as expected.
Finally, to address potential confounding e¤ects of the economic cycle, tables (11), (12), and (13) show that the magnitude and signi…cance of the results remain when including the regional unemployment rate as one of the controls.
Therefore, the law change increased school attendance of children of high school age and boys between 0 and 5 years old in 2 percentage points. The law also reduced child work by one percentage point, but this e¤ect is not as robust as the e¤ect on school attendance.
Labor Market Outcomes
Two labor market outcomes are analyzed for the household head and his/her partner: work status and hours worked. Given that these are household outcomes, the regressions are at the household level. For each of these outcomes, two regressions are shown. The …rst is speci…cation (8) and the second includes the person's schooling, age, a urban dummy, and a set of regional dummies.
Figures (5) and (6) show the proportion of working "mothers" and "fathers".
It can be seen that less than 40% of women work and those in cohabiting relationships are more likely to be working than those who are married. The inverse is true for males: those in the latter are more likely to be working. Given the censoring of hours worked, both OLS and tobit coe¢ cients are presented for this outcome 14 . In the case of work status, the marginal e¤ect of the probits are shown. Table ( 14) shows the results of the di¤erence in di¤erence regression for these two outcomes. The …rst four columns show the marginal e¤ect when the dependent variable is log of mother's hours worked. The coe¢ cients for the OLS and tobit speci…cation are similar. Including controls, there is a 4% decrease in worked hours for the mother. However, the standard errors are large and the coe¢ cients are not signi…cant.
In the next four columns the dependent variable is log of hours worked for the father. In all speci…cations the coe¢ cient of interest is signi…cant and implies a decrease in hours worked between 7 and 11% (for a mean of 4.1). This change is not expected from the Nash bargaining model, which implied an increase of 1 4 When log(hours) is missing, it is replaced by zero.
male's hours worked as consequence of the increase of female's bargaining power.
The last four columns of table (14) show the marginal e¤ect from probit regressions when the dependent variable is the probability of working for females and males respectively. As before, no signi…cant e¤ect is found for women.
However, a signi…cant decrease in males'probability of working is found, when controls are included. The coe¢ cient implies a decrease in the probability of working of 0.01 (for a mean of 0.79). The two results in male's labor market outcomes imply a law change e¤ect both on the intensive and extensive margin.
As before, the existence of underlying trends explaining these results is tested with a false experiment, which is shown in table (15). Depending on the controls and the speci…cation used (OLS or Tobit), a signi…cant e¤ect on male's hours worked is found. In the case of the probability of being working, the relevant coe¢ cient is never signi…cant. The former suggests the existance of an underlying trend that could explain the previuos e¤ect found for males'hours worked.
Finally, to adress the concern of business cycles e¤ects, table (16) shows that all results are robust to the inclusion of the regional unemployment rate. There is no e¤ect on the coe¢ cients and the standard errors are smaller.
Summing up, no e¤ect is found on female's labor outcomes and an e¤ect on both the extensive and intensive margin is found for male's labor supply.
The e¤ect on the probability of working is more robust to the false experiment than the e¤ect on hours worked. These results contradict the Nash-bargaining model predictions and are compatible with a tax model in which the increase in sharing produced by the increased female's bargaining power is understood by men as an income tax.
Conclusion
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